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THE NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
between the estates of the partners. 14 By analogy the estate by the
entirety should go first to pay the joint creditors. In some jurisdictions
where the estate by the entirety is not recognized in personalty received
from sale of realty held by entireties, 15 it is suggested that the surplus
should be divided' 6 between the estates of the spouses for payment of
the individual debts. The surplus, however, in other jurisdictions
would still be held by the entireties. 17 In these jurisdictions the trustee
of the estate of the individual spouse would not be vested with any part
of the surplus since a judgment creditor of the individual spouse could
not reach it,8 and the trustee has no more right than such creditor.' 9
The suggested distribution would protect joint creditors who make
loans believing they will be satisfied out of the estate by the entirety
and would allow the surplus to be used, when the law permits, in payment of the debts of the individual spouses.
ROBERT BOOTH.

Bankruptcy-Jurisdiction of Court Under 1933 Amendments.
A decision which will prove to be of unusual interest' to the profession, and of far-reaching importance, 2 is that of the Circuit Court of
Appeals in In re Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Railway Company.3
The railway company filed its petition in the Northern District of
Illinois for reorganization under the new Section 77 of the Bankruptcy
Act.4 More than four months prior to the filing of the petition, the railway company had borrowed an aggregate of more than $17,000,000 from
the Reconstruction Finance Corporation, two New York banks, two Illi11 U. S. C. A. §23 (f) (1927) ; Crawford v. Sternberg, 220 Fed. 73 (C. C
A. 8th, 1915) ; Titus v. Mawell, 281 Fed. 433 (C. C. A. 6th, 1922).
'Note (1935) 13 N. C. L. REv. 256.
"Division might be made
(1) by giving each estate a proportional part of
the surplus according to the portion each spouse paid of the purchase price; or
(2) by allotting one half of the surplus to each estate. The effect of this would
be to consider as a gift to one spouse by the other any amount in excess of one
half of the purchase price which the latter paid. See Arnold v. Lang, 11 F. (2d)
630 (E. D. Mo. 1926).
n Note (1935) 13 N. C. L. Rxv.
'Hill Top Savings and Trust Co. v. Worley, 16 Pa. Dist. 250 (1906).
Cullom v. Kearns, 8 F. (2d) 437 (C. C. A. 4th, 1925).
Certiorari has been granted by the Supreme Court of the United States.
'See note 5 infra.
372 F. (2d) 443 (C. C. A. 7th, 1934).
4 11 U. S. C. A. §205 (1934 Supp.). For a general discussion of this Section,
see Garrison, Reorganization of Railroads under the Bankruptcy Act (1933) 1
U. oF CHIac. L. Rxv. 71; Hanna, Recent Additions to the Bankruptcy Act (1933)
1 GEO. WASH. L. Rzv. 448; Richter. Recent Amendments to the Bankruptcy Act
(1933) 8 NoTRE DAmE LAWY. 460; Rodgers and Groom, Reorganization of
Railroad Corporations under Section 77 of the Bankruptcy Act (1933) 33 COL.
L. REv. 571; Weiner, Reorganization under Sectioi4 77: A Comment (1933) 33
COL. L. Rxv. 834; Wilson, Railroad Reorganization under Section 77 of the
Bankruptcy Act (1933) 19 A. B. A. J. 665.

NOTES AND COMMENTS
nois banks, and a Missouri bank. As collateral for these loans, $54,000,000 in securities, consisting largely of otherwise unissued bonds of the
railway company itself and of its subsidiaries, were pledged under an
agreement which gave the creditors a power of sale, conditioned upon
the happening of certain contingencies relating to the debtor's financial
status. Upon petition of the railway company, the District Court issued
an order enjoining these creditors from exercising the power of sale,
or from otherwise converting or disposing of the pledged collateral.
All of the creditors had filed special appearances to contest the Court's
jurisdiction over them and over the pledged securities.
On appeal, the Circuit Court of Appeals (per Evans, J.) affirmed
the order, relying solely, as to the jurisdictional question, upon that portion of paragraph (a) of Section 77 which reads: ". . . If the petition
is so approved, the court in which such order approving the petition
is entered shall, during the pendency of the proceedings under this section and for the purposes thereof, have exclusive jurisdiction of the
debtor and its property wherever located... ."5 This language, according to the opinion, "extended the court's jurisdiction over the debtor's
property so as to include the entire United States." That being so, the
pledged collateral was held to be "property" within the meaning of the
Section,6 and the jurisdictional issue was disposed of by saying, "In
short, the jurisdiction of the court, so far as the property was concerned,
included the territory wherein all of appellees' bonds were located." 7
'Italics ours. The importance of this decision is increased by the fact that
the quoted language of §77 is also to be found substantially in §§74 (for the
relief of agricultural debtors) (11 U. S. C. A. §203n) and 77B (on corporate reorganizations) (11 U. S. C. A. §207a).
'No attempt is made in this note to deal with that aspect of the problem.
However, see Guaranty Trust Co. v. Galveston City R. Co., 87 Fed. 813, 815 (C. C.
A. 5th, 1898), where Court said: "They are evidence of debt, not assets of the
appellee." Compare Mississippi Valley Trust Co. v. Railway Steel Spring Co., 258
Fed. 346 (C. C. A. 8th, 1919).
"TheCourt then proceeded to hold that the District Court not only had the
power to enjoin the sale of pledged securities, but might do so in a summary
proceeding, relying again upon §77 and giving it a "liberal construction.., consonant with the purposes of this remedial legislation."
These two problems are not within the scope of this note. However, the
decision, on both points, seems to be against the weight of judicial opinion prior
to the enactment of §77.
On the first point, see, in general, accord: Mississippi Valley Trust Co. v.
Railway Steel Spring Co., 258 Fed. 346 (C. C. A. 8th, 1919). Contra: Jerome v.
McCarter, 94 U.S. 734, 24 L. ed. 136 (1876); Hiscock v. Varick Bank, 206 U.S.
28, 27 Sup. Ct. 681, 51 L. ed. 945 (1907) ; In re Hudson River Nay. Corp., 57 F.
(2d) 175 (C. C. A. 2d, 1932) ; In re Browne, 104 Fed. 762 (E. D. Pa. 1900). Also
REMINGTON, BANKRUPTCY (4th ed. 1934) §§923, 2510; 2 COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY
(13th. ed. 1923) 1550-53; Note (1924) 28 A. L. R. 409; Hatch, A Fort of Depression Finance-CorporationsPledging Their Own Bonds (1934) 47 HARy.
L. REV. 1093.
On the second point, see, in general, In re Silver, 2 F. Supp. 628 (S.D. Fla.
1933) ; REImNGTON, BANKRUPTCY (4th, ed. 1934) §2350; I CoLLIER, BANKRUPTCY
(13th, ed. 1923) 771-89.
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The decision is in striking contrast with one of the same Court
8
(Evans, J. again writing the opinion), decided only two years before.
In that case, two of the Insull holding companies, both of which were
Illinois corporations, had pledged the stocks of certain other Illinois
corporations with New York banks to secure loans from the latter. Both
holding companies went into receivership, and, on petition of the receivers, the District Court for the Northern District of Illinois enjoined
the creditor banks from exercising the power of sale given in the pledge
agreement, and from otherwise converting or disposing of the pledged
securities. The banks appeared specially, and moved to vacate the restraining orders on the ground that the Court was without jurisdiction
over either the banks or the pledged property. On appeal, the Circuit
Court of Appeals ordered the injunctions vacated, holding that the
Court had no jurisdiction over the parties, and that "the absence of
possession, or any right to possession by the receivers, and the location
of the pledged securities with the pledgees in New York" were "decisive of the question." In the course of his opinions 9 in the Fentress
case, judge Evans remarked that "the jurisdiction of a court in bankruptcy in such matters is as extensive as that of a court of equity which
appoints a receiver."
Was the jurisdiction of the court sitting in bankruptcy any 'more extensive than when sitting in an equity receivership, prior to the amendment? The Court's reliance upon the quoted language of the amendment in disposing of the jurisdictional question would indicate that it
was not. Section 2 of the Bankruptcy Act 0 expressly limited the jurisdiction of the court to the territorial limits of the district, and the process of a bankruptcy court could not validly issue outside those boundaries.'. However, upon the filing of the petition, the property of the
bankrupt, wherever situated in the United States, was brought in custodia legis,'2 and the court in which the petition was filed obtained
"plenary jurisdiction in bankruptcy, coextensive with the United States,
I Guaranty Trust Co. v. Fentress, 61 F. (2d) 329 (C. C. A. 7th, 1932).
p. 333.
"011 U. S. C. A. §11 (1927).
"Babbitt v. Dutcher, 216 U. S. 102, 30 Sup. Ct. 372, 54 L. ed. 402 (1910)
seinble; Acme Harvester Co. v. Beekman Lumber Co., 222 U.S. 300, 32 Sup. Ct.
96, 56 L. ed. 208 (1911) semble; Staunton v. Wooden, 179 Fed. 61 (C.C.A.9th,
1910); In re Farrell, 201 Fed. 338 (C. C. A. 6th, 1912) ; Carter v. Whisler, 275
Fed. 743 (C. C. A. 8th, 1921) ; It re Waukesha Water Co., 116 Fed. 1009 (E. D.
Wis. 1902) ; In re Alphin & Lake Cotton Co., 131 Fed. 824 (E.D. Ark. 1904) ;
In re Isaac Harris Co., 173 Fed. 735 (E.D. N.Y. 1909) ; In re Rathfon Bros.,
200 Feb. 108 (W.D. Mich. 1912) ; It re Boston-Cerrillos Mines Corp., 206 Fed.
794 (D. N.M. 1913); In re Geller, 216 Fed. 558 (D. N.J. 1914); REmINGTON,
BANKRUPTCY (4th, ed. 1934) §34; 1 COLLIe, BANKRUPTCY (13th, ed. 1923) §2g.
"Lazarus v. Prentice, 234 U. S. 263, 34 Sup. Ct. 851, 58 L. ed. 1305 (1914);
Fairbanks Steam Shovel Co. v. Wills, 240 U.S. 642, 36 Sup. Ct. 466, 60 L. ed.
841 (1916) ; In re Dempster, 172 Fed. 353 (C. C. A. 8th, 1909).
9
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to order and control the disposition of the bankrupt's estate" and "to
determine all liens thereon and all interests affecting it."'1 This jurisdiction did not attach, however, when the bankruptcy court had neither
actual nor constructive possession of the property.1 4 Thus, an explanation may be found for the fact that in the Fentresscase, the decision
on the jurisdictional question rested jointly upon the absence of possession, or right to possession, in the receivers, and the situs of the
pledged collateral outside the territorial limits of the district, while, in
the principal case, no mention is made of the Court's possession or right
to possession,' 5 but the pledged property is held to be within the newly
enlarged territorialjurisdiction of the Court; and that enlargement of
territorialjurisdiction is found in the amendment giving the court "exclusive jurisdiction of the debtor and its property wherever located."
Was that portion of Section 77 intended to enlarge the territorial
jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court, so as to make it coextensive with
the United States, in proceedings under the amendment? The Court
believed that the amendment "was intended to and did wisely exclude
ancillary receivership proceedings in bankruptcy cases wherein railroad
corporations were the bankrupts." The belief in that purpose points
strongly to the interpretation which the Court adopted.' 6 However,
there are at least three considerations that militate against the conclusion
of the Court.
In the first place, the word "jurisdiction" has been subjected to such
indiscriminate use and has been permitted to assume so many connotations' 7 that its use in the amendment furnishes no very valuable clue
"Lazarus v. Prentice, 234 U.S. 263, 34 Sup. Ct. 851, 58 L. ed. 1305 (1914) ;
In re Granite City Bank, 137 Fed. 818 (C. C. A. 8th, 1905) ; Orinoco Iron Co. v.
Metzel, 230 Fed. 40 (C. C. A. 6th, 1916) ; see Staunton v. Wooden, 179 Fed. 61
63 (C. C. A. 9th, 1910).
14
In re Hudson River Nay. Corp., 57 F. (2d) 175 (C. C. A. 2d, 1932) ; In re
Silver, 2 F. Supp, 628 (S.D. Fla. 1933) ; see In re Peacock, 178 Fed. 851, 856
(C.C. E.D. N.C. 1910) ; In re Dayton Coal & Iron Co., 291 Fed. 390, 396 (E.D.
Tenn. 1922) ; In re Smith, 3 F. (2d) 40, 42 (S.D. Tex. 1924) ; 1 CoLLIER, BANKRuPTcY (13th, ed. 1923) 781-82.

The right to possession could have been no greater in one case than in the
other. In re Hudson River Nav. Corp., 57 F. (2d) 175 (C. C. A. 2d, 1932). See
.i;re Landquist, 70 F. (2d) 929, 936 (C. C. A. 7th, 1934), where the Court said:
"So far as we know it has always been held that a bankruptcy court has no
jurisdiction whatever over pledged security which has been transferred in good
faith by a debtor to his creditor more than four months prior to the filing of
the bankruptcy petition."
" In this connection, see REPORT PAMPHLET No. 1. THE AssOCIATIoN OF THE
BAR OF THE CrT= OF NEW YORK (1926-7). ANNUAL REPORT OF SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON EQUITY REcErvRsirPs, pp. 19-31, in which an extension of the doctrine of

§56 of the Judicial Code (11 U. S. C. A. §117) was advocated. See also, 56 A.
B. A. REP. 406-9 (1931) ; and Swaine, Corporate Reorganizatio-AnAmendmtent
to the Bankruptcy Act-A Symposium (1933) 19 VA. L. Rv. 317.
"TAs was said by Professor Lloyd, in referring to the use of the word "lien,"
"It is proof of the poverty of the legal imagination that in so many instances
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to the Congressional intent. This is strikingly impressed upon one who
reads the decisions of the bankruptcy courts and attempts to assign
some meaning to the word wherever used. On at least one occasion, the
Circuit Court of Appeals referred to the powers of the bankruptcy court,
long prior to the enactment of the Section 77, in language practically
identical with that of the amendment upon which the Court relied in the
principal case' 8-and at a time when the territorialjurisdiction of the
bankruptcy courts was expressly limited, and the limitation recognized 139 Is language to be given one meaning when used by the courts,
and another when used by Congress in a piece of rush legislation?
Secondly, paragraph (n) of Section 77 provides, in part, that "in
proceedings under this section and consistent with the provisions thereof,
the jwrisdiction20 and powers of the court ... shall be the same as if
a voluntary petition for adjudication had been filed. .. ." Is it clear
that, if this paragraph is read with paragraph (a), Congress referred
to territorial jurisdiction in paragraph (a), and to something else in
paragraph (n) ?
Thirdly, insofar as there is any value in speculating on the question of Congressional intent, it might be added that the relative obscurity
of the provision relied upon by the Court leads one to the conclusion
that no very revolutionary change was intended thereby. If Congress
had intended to enlarge the territorial jurisdiction of bankruptcy courts
in certain cases from the limits of the district to include the entire United
States, is it not reasonable to presume that such an intention would have
been phrased more unmistakably and placed a bit more conspicuously in
the amendment?
It is submitted that, in view of the foregoing considerations, the
Court's decision on this point is at least dubious, 2 1"' the Court, perhaps,
terms definitely applied to particular purposes are forcibly appropriated to other

uses." (Lloyd, Mortgages-The Genesis of the Lien Theory (1922) 32 YAixu
L. J. 233, 245).
s In In re Granite City Bank, 137 Fed. 818, 822 (C. C. A. 8th, 1905, the Court
said: "Under the scheme of the bankrupt act, the District Court of the domicile
of the bankrupt takes exclusive jurisdiction of the bankrupt and his property,
wherever situated, to administer it and distribute the proceeds pari passu among
the creditors." (Italics ours.)
Other illustrations of such language are to be found in In re Dempster, 172
Fed. 353, 355 (C. C. A. 8th, 1909) ; Staunton v. Wooden, 179 Fed. 61, 63 (C. C. A.
9th, 1910) ; and a particularly interesting example in Orinoco Iron Co. v. Metzel,
230 Fed. 40, 46 (C. C. A. 6th, 1916).

"Note 11 supra.

- Italics ours.

z It is not to be understood that this note takes a position critical of the policy
which apparently impelled the Court to the general result reached in the case
and prompted it to hurdle the jurisdictional problem in order to reach that result.
The note, rather, raises the quesion whether or not the language of the amendment (upon which the Court was forced to, and did, rely) justified the hurdle
which the Court made.
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assuming the equitable viewpoint in "regarding as done that which ought
to be done."
D. W.

MARKHAM.

Banks and Banking-Insolvency-Recovery of Funds Held by
Insolvent Bank as Trustee Ex Maleficio.
The trust department of the C. Bank had approximately two hundred small trust accounts, whose uninvested funds had been included in
a general deposit maintained by it in the commercial department. To
facilitate investment the trust department consolidated these small accounts into what it termed a "Mortgage Pool Account," with itself as
trustee, and each estate was credited with a participation certificate to
the extent of its contribution. A consolidated account totaling $155,940
was thereby built up out of which the bank purchased from its own departments, affiliated investment companies, and elsewhere securities aggregating $151,867.34, leaving a cash credit in the pool account of $4,072.66. Subsequently the bank dosed its doors, and the plaintiffs were
appointed to succeed it as trustees for the "Mortgage Pool Account."
In this action it was alleged and to some extent proved that the securities sold to the pool account then had a market value of $60,746.93 less
than the sums actually paid therefor. On this basis plaintiffs sought
to impress the bank's cash in the hands of the Commissioner of Banks
'with a constructive trust in favor of the estates represented by them.
Held, that the judgment of nonsuit be affirmed.It is well settled that a fiduciary may be declared a trustee cx waleficio of any profits which he may have acquired through his dealings
with the funds committed to his care,2 and, since creditors are not bona
fide purchasers, the rule is applicable to the receiver 3 of an insolvent
trustee. Such a proceeding, however, is not, as is so often stated, one
to establish a preference, but, rather, an action brought to restore to the
cestui that which equity considers his own.4 Success will depend upon
the proof of two facts: (a) that the alleged trustee, whether express or
ex delicto, has at the outset acquired something of value the beneficial
ownership of which remains, either by express or implied provisions
of the parties, or in the contemplation of law, in another; and (b) that
'Cocke v. Hood, 207 N. C. 14, 175 S. E. 841 (1934).
23 PoMEROY, EQuIrY JURIsPRUDENcE (4th ed. 1918) §§1052, 1058; Notes (1931)

44 HAv. L. Rv. 1281; (1927) 43 L. Q. REv. 438.
*The same principles would, of course, be applicable to an assignee for
benefit of creditors or trustee in bankruptcy.
IPowesheik County v. Merchants' Nat. Bank, 220 N. W. 63, 209 Iowa 467,
228 N. W. 32 (1928) ; cf. Capital Nat. Bank v. First Nat. Bank, .172 U. S. .425,
19 Sup. Ct. 202, 43 L. ed. 502 (1898) (Such an action against the receiver of
a national bank raises no federal question.)

